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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European financial system is plagued by two
major sources of uncertainty. First, there is still
mistrust over the quality of banks’ balance sheets.
Second (and related to the first), major uncer-
tainty remains about the rules that will apply to
bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank
resolution in 2014 and in years to come.
The fact that the European Central Bank is due to
become the single supervisor for euro-area banks,
and that it will conduct a far-reaching preliminary
assessment of banks’ balance sheets, has the
potential to greatly reduce the first uncertainty,
because a centralised assessment will make bal-
ance-sheet information more transparent, com-
parable and credible. The ECB has already outlined
the broad structure of the exercise and some
important technical elements underpinning it,
such as, for example, the 8 percent threshold of
core Tier 1 capital that will be used as the bench-
mark capital level. However, to date, important
parameters remain still undecided and/or have not
yet been communicated. These include in partic-
ular the treatment of sovereign debt, the magni-
tude of the stress test and the treatment of
systemic risk. In light of the relevance of these
variables for the formation of market expectations
ex ante and for the credibility of the stress tests
ex post, it will be important for the ECB to be as
transparent as possible as early as possible.
The choices that still have to be made about these
elements can potentially affect the results of the
exercise. Market analysts and academics have put
forward numerous estimates of the recapitalisa-
tion needs that might be identified by the stress
tests for the euro-area banking system. The esti-
mates vary widely between €50 billion and €650
billion. Differences in estimates are explained by
the lack of information about the balance sheets
of banks, and by the uncertainty over central
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parameters of the exercise, in particular the way
the systemic dimension of the exercise will be
approached. 
If a recapitalisation need is identified, decisions
will need to be taken about how the capital need
will be met. In the current situation, the main guid-
ing framework is national decision-making author-
ity. Some harmonisation is introduced via the
amended state-aid framework, which is discussed
in this Policy Contribution. This regime however
could lead to potentially significant differences
between countries and could thereby deepen
financial fragmentation. The Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) will improve the situ-
ation significantly in terms of harmonisation, but it
will not be applied in 2014 when the ECB results
will be known. 
The discussion about bail-in is likely to remain top-
ical in the context of this exercise. The modified
state-aid regime de facto introduces bail-in of
junior debt as a precondition for accessing public
funds for bank recapitalisation. The BRRD will
introduce tougher requirements from 2016. The
new steady-state system should be based on
strict and clear rules. However de facto, policy dis-
cretion will always be exercised in some excep-
tional cases in order to prevent major systemic
fall-outs from bail-ins. Who exercises this discre-
tion, and how they do it, are of central importance. 
Finally, there is the question of how remaining
recapitalisation costs should be distributed
between national taxpayers and taxpayers of
other European countries. While during the transi-
tion phase to the new steady state, national tax-
payers will inevitably have to shoulder most of the
burden, we argue that in order to credibly break
the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns,
a European insurance scheme for the large risks,03
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ernments should accept and support cross-
border bank mergers where sensible. They
should also be ready to recapitalise banks
where necessary. 
￿ To credibly break the link between banks and
sovereigns, the Eurogroup should agree that
the same rules be applied to bank recapitalisa-
tion and creditor involvement in different coun-
tries also in the transition period. Bail-ins of
senior debt in the transition should not be
excluded ex-ante but the potential systemic
implications will always need to be assessed. 
￿ The public funds will mostly come from national
taxpayer resources. In some cases, a European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme with
the country may be needed. Cost sharing for
bank recapitalisation may be necessary in
order to prevent government insolvency.
￿ Decisions on bail-in, bank restructuring and
resolution should be based on rules that limit
discretion and prevent different approaches in
different countries. However, even in the steady
state, there is always an element of policy dis-
cretion because the situation and implications
are different depending on the case and cannot
be fully made automatic. It is of crucial impor-
tance that the policy discretion is exercised by
a European resolution authority. Relying on
national authorities only can lead to major dif-
ferences and applications in different coun-
tries, thereby undermining financial integration
and reinforcing the re-nationalisation of finance
that has been seen in the last few years. This is
not only sub-optimal but also undermines mon-
etary integration. 
￿ A clear and credible commitment to a single
resolution mechanism and a common back-
stop are important to reverse banking re-
nationalisation. The transition period should
not be too long to avoid prolonged financial
fragmentation with negative implications for
growth and jobs. A resolution fund, even when
fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal
backstop to be credible.
combined with a contribution from national tax-
payers is needed in the steady state.
A number of important policy priorities follow:
￿ To end uncertainty, the ECB should soon trans-
parently communicate the central parameters
of the comprehensive assessment, in order to
allow for private sector solutions. The risk con-
nected to sovereign debt holding should be
assessed in the Asset Quality Review (AQR) by
treating it at a discount reflecting the current
market value. But sovereign debt should not be
part of the forward looking stress-test exercise.
The resulting better capitalisation should
strengthen the lending by banks to corpora-
tions and households. The ECB should also say
how it will treat and take into account systemic
interconnectedness. 
￿ Once the exercise is underway, the ECB should
not shy away from forcing non-viable banks
into restructuring. We acknowledge that this
could lead to short-term volatility on the finan-
cial markets, which could be unavoidable, but
this should be weighed against the cost of a
lasting weak and dysfunctional banking
system and the value of the credibility of the
ECB as a supervisor and a monetary authority.
The ECB needs to be ready to provide large
amounts of liquidity to the remainder of the
financial system following the closure of banks.
￿ To credibly break the link between banks and
sovereigns, creditors need to be more involved
in the sharing of the burden than during most
of the last five years. Toughening and advanc-
ing bail-in rules is one element of this strategy.
However, for senior debt during the transition
period until 2016, a systemic risk evaluation
should be made before proceeding to the bail-
in. The senior creditor bail-in should only occur
for banks that are put in 'gone concern'. 
￿ Governments should support the ECB in its
effort to restructure and bring the banking
system back to health. Most importantly, gov-1. See Constâncio (2013)
on the way the SSM will fur-
ther harmonisation.
2. This is what Bruegel
scholar Nicolas Véron has
called the ‘Sanio doctrine’
referring to the first large
bail-out of the crisis that
happened in Germany at the
insistence of the BaFin pres-
ident Jochen Sanio, with ref-
erence to the systemic
nature of the affected bank
and the Pfandbrief market.
3. Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and
Wolff (2013) estimate the
figure for Ireland to be about
€5-10 billion.
4. See, for example,
Asmussen (2012).
5. Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff
(2010) empirically demon-
strate that larger banking
sectors and less-capitalised
banking sectors can poten-
tially constitute a significant
burden on taxpayers and
are therefore positively cor-
related with sovereign risk,
in particular when risk aver-
sion is increasing. 
6. During the negotiations of
the financial assistance pro-
gramme for Cyprus, the
Eurogroup initially agreed to
also bail-in insured deposi-
tors. The resulting bank run
led to a change in the deci-
sion and the safeguarding of
insured depositors, but in
the following weeks, con-
cern arose in the market
about whether Cyprus
should be considered a
‘template’ for the application
of bail-in in the near future.
savings to the taxpayer were rather subdued3. This
opposition was mainly rooted in the concern –
justified or not – that forcing losses on private
investors would have had disruptive
consequences for the stability of the financial
system of the countries concerned, and of the
euro area as a whole4.
The general approach changed – although slowly
– when it became evident that the strategy of total
bailouts was costly and could have major sys-
temic consequences. The channels are well
known by now: high costs associated to bank
recapitalisation cast doubts on the sustainability
of public finances, initiating a ‘vicious circle’5
between sovereigns’ and banks’ misfortunes,
which has been one of the characteristic feature
of this crisis. Faced with the high cost of public
bank rescues, European policymakers started to
talk more openly about the possibility of private-
sector participation. This started to be seen as a
way to both reduce the cost for the taxpayer and to
foster the right incentives, by allocating responsi-
bilities to those that took risks in the first place.
The Cyprus episode marked a jump to the
extreme, leading to considerable confusion about
the applicable framework for bank recapitalisa-
tion6. Since then, all in all, the EU has shifted from
a framework in which private participation was
abhorred to one where it will become the norm, but
the transition is tricky and the timing is challeng-
ing especially in relation to the ECB’s forthcoming
comprehensive assessment of banks.
Against this background, we start by discussing
estimates of potential recapitalisation needs that
could result from the ECB’s assessment of banks.
This highlights that important choices, which will
influence the outcome of the exercise, have not
yet been made. It also highlights the fact that the
ECB assessment will be de facto an assessment
of the banking system and not just individual
banks – which is necessary to restore trust but
which is delicate, in view of the potentially
substantial recapitalisation needs that it could
imply. We then review the new rules on bank
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INTRODUCTION
The European Council's June 2012 commitment
to break the vicious circle between banks and sov-
ereigns by creating a banking union is one of the
most important steps taken towards a more inte-
grated euro area. Since then, the co-legislators
have agreed on the first element of banking union,
the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM). Discussions on the single resolution mech-
anism (SRM) are still ongoing at the time of writ-
ing. There is now a political agreement on the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). A cen-
tral aspect of the political discussion is the rules
governing the recapitalisation of banks and the
important transitional arrangements on the way
towards banking union. This Policy Contribution
focuses on the question of recapitalisation of
banks to be supervised by the SSM, putting spe-
cial emphasis on the transition.
The European economy is currently plagued by
two major sources of uncertainty about the finan-
cial system and banks in particular. First, there is
still uncertainty about the information on the qual-
ity of banks’ balance sheets. The fact that super-
visors are to date still national means that outside
investors cannot be fully sure that risk models are
harmonised in different countries, and they may
also have doubts about the reliability of different
national supervisors. The fact that the ECB
becomes the single supervisor and will conduct a
far-reaching initial assessment of banks’ balance
sheets will greatly reduce this uncertainty1.
The second major uncertainty concerns the rules
that will apply to bank recapitalisation, bank
restructuring and bank resolution. The European
approach towards banking issues in general – and
bank recapitalisation specifically – has changed
considerably since 2008, jumping from one
extreme to the other. Initially, the prevailing view
was that private sector participation needed to be
avoided at all costs2. The ECB itself was adamantly
against forcing losses on the private creditors of
Irish banks, where admittedly the potential
‘The fact that supervisors are to date still national means that outside investors cannot be fully
sure that risk models are harmonised in different countries, and they may also have doubts
about the reliability of different national supervisors.’Silvia Merler and Guntram B. Wolff  ENDING UNCERTAINTY
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7. Council Regulation (EU)
No 1024/2013 of 15 Octo-
ber 2013 conferring specific
tasks on the ECB concerning
policies relating to the pru-
dential supervision of credit
institutions.
8. ECB Note, Comprehensive
Assessment October 2013,
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ub/pdf/other/notecompre-
hensiveassess-
ment201310en.pdf.
9. See Comprehensive Capi-
tal Analysis and Review
2014 Summary Instructions
and Guidance, 1 November
2013, http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/pres
s/bcreg/bcreg20131101a2.
pdf, and 2014 Supervisory
Scenarios for Annual Stress
Tests Required under the
Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test-
ing Rules and the Capital
Plan Rule, 1 November
2013, http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/bankinforeg/bcre
g20131101a1.pdf.
10. CRD IV establishes five
new capital buffers: the cap-
ital conservation buffer, the
counter-cyclical buffer, the
systemic risk buffer, the
global systemic institutions
buffer and the other sys-
temic institutions buffer. In
addition, supervisors may
add extra capital to cover for
other risks following a
supervisory review, and
institutions may also decide
to hold an additional
amount of capital. See
http://europa.eu/rapid/press
-release_MEMO-13-
690_en.htm.
11. The CRR follows Basel III
and sets 13 criteria that any
instrument would have to
meet to qualify as CET 1. The
criteria are listed in Article
28(5) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013.
12. The transition period is
established to ensure that
before the new capital
requirements apply in full,
banks are given time to
adapt in order to avoid nega-
recapitalisation and note that there is still
considerable uncertainty, which should be
removed before the ECB takes over as supervisor.  
1 BANK RECAPITALISATION NEEDS, WHAT TO
EXPECT
1.1 Elements of uncertainty in the design
The ECB will assume its new supervisory tasks in
November 2014. Before that, together with
national competent authorities (NCAs), the ECB
will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
banking system, to be concluded in October 2014.
This exercise will involve all banks that will in the
future be directly supervised by the ECB, ie about
130 banks in 18 euro-area countries, accounting
for approximately 85 percent of total euro-area
bank assets. The comprehensive assessment is
to be undertaken by the ECB based on the transi-
tional arrangements laid out in Article 33.4 of the
SSM regulation7; national authorities and the credit
institutions concerned will supply the necessary
information as requested. According to the ECB,
the assessment has three elements8:
￿ A supervisory risk assessment, addressing key
risks in the banks’ balance sheets, including
liquidity, leverage and funding. 
￿ An asset quality review, examining the asset
side of banks’ balance sheets as of 31 Decem-
ber 2013. All asset classes, including non-per-
forming loans, restructured loans and
sovereign exposures, will be covered. 
￿ A stress test, building on and complementing
the asset quality review by providing a forward-
looking view of banks’ shock-absorption capac-
ity under stress. 
The ECB will set capital thresholds as a benchmark
for the outcomes of the exercise amounting to 8
percent Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1). The thresh-
old is decomposed to 4.5 percent, which is the
ratio that will be legally mandatory as of 1 Janu-
ary 2014 according to Capital Requirement Direc-
tive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirement
Regulation (CRR), a capital conservation buffer of
2.5 percent, and an add-on of 1 percent to take
into account the systemic relevance of banks. The
capital ratios make reference to the new regime
that will phase in with the Capital Requirement IV
Directive. The 4.5 percent is the minimum CET 1
capital ratio required under CRD IV (up from 2 per-
cent) whereas the capital conservation buffer is a
new prudential tool introduced by the Basel III
standard on bank capital adequacy, stress testing
and market liquidity risk, and implemented by the
CRD IV, which sets it at 2.5 percent of Risk
Weighted Assets (RWAs). The capital conservation
buffer will however only start to phase in gradu-
ally as of 2016. CRD IV includes also a mandatory
systemic risk buffer of between 1 and 3.5 percent
CET 1 of RWAs for banks that are identified by the
relevant authority as globally systemically impor-
tant. Moreover, CRD IV also gives the supervisor an
option to set a buffer on 'other' systemically
important institutions, including domestically-
important institutions and EU-important institu-
tions. The decision by the ECB to introduce an
additional systemic buffer echoes a choice previ-
ously made by the Federal Reserve9 in its recent
stress tests10.
These being the cornerstones of the exercise, two
factors create uncertainty. The first is the defini-
tion of capital. There are in fact two elements that
play a role in a stress test: (i) the size of capital
ratios to be met and (ii) the strictness of the defi-
nition of capital (ie what instrument can and
cannot be counted as CET 1). For given capital
ratios, a tighter definition of CET 1 makes it more
difficult for banks to meet the requirement. The
element of uncertainty in the context of the ECB
exercise stems from the fact that the latter will be
taking place at the same time as the phase in of
the new requirements foreseen in the EU Capital
Regulation and Directives (CRD IV and CRR), which
change the definition of capital by making it
stricter11. Currently-used instruments that do not
meet the new requirements will have to be phased
out. Both Basel III and Capital Requirement Regu-
lation (CRR) foresee long transition periods12. This
means that banks will start adjusting next year to
the new definition of capital, whereas the ECB
exercise will use balance-sheet data as of end
2013, ie before the beginning of the transition. The
definition of instrument that will counted as Tier 1
in the stress test is therefore important and it has
not yet been entirely clarified by the ECB13.
A second non-negligible element of uncertainty
concerns the post-stress-test outcomes. To datetive consequences for their
activity of lending to the
economy. In particular the
phase out of capital instru-
ments that will not meet the
new and stricter eligibility
criteria is to last eight years
from 2014.
13. The guidelines state that
“the capital definition of 1
January 2014 will apply for
the asset quality review,
whereas the definition that
is valid at the end of the
horizon will be used for the
stress test”. With the hori-
zon of a stress test normally
being around 3 years, the
“definition valid at the end
of the horizon”could include
part of the transition period
before the implementation
of the stricter capital defini-
tion that would apply under
CRD IV/CRR. But the ECB
would be using (and stress-
ing) underlying balance
sheet data at end-2013, ie
before the transition to the
new capital definition
comes into effect, which
could create a problematic
mismatch.
14. Current legislation only
foresees the 4.5 percent
threshold for existing bank
balance sheets. Once the
transition phase for capital
conversion buffers is over,
the law would also require
banks that do not hold the
full 2.5 percent capital con-
version buffer to refrain from
certain practices, such as
payments of dividends.
However, these rules are for-
mally not applicable in
2014.
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it has neither been communicated what would
happen with banks falling below the 4.5 percent
threshold in the comprehensive assessment, nor
it is clear how tough the ECB will be with banks
above 4.5 percent but below 8 percent14.
The ECB has signalled that it will publish further
details about the comprehensive assessment by
the end of January 2014.
1.2 Market expectations
Researchers and bank analysts have expressed
their hope that the exercise will be a central ele-
ment in the strategy to restore trust in Europe’s
banking system. One big difference between the
current exercise and previous European Banking
Authority exercises is that the ECB will actually
become the competent supervisor. It will therefore
have far-reaching powers and it will also be able
to make sure that banks’ internal risk models will
be harmonised. This should contribute substan-
tially to restoring trust in Europe’s banking system.
Currently, market-based valuations of banks in
Europe suggest that investors still do not trust
entirely the quality of banks’ balance sheets.
Figure 1 shows that the market-to-book value of
major banks in five selected euro-area countries
is below 1, which indicates that stocks are either
systematically undervalued or that the market
suspects that balance sheets still hide significant
potential losses.
Concerns may be justified in light of the gener-
alised rise in Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) on the
balance sheets of European banks, especially in
southern European countries. The absence of har-
monisation in the definition of NPLs implies that
numbers are not entirely comparable across coun-
tries (Barisitz, 2013) and adds another element
of opacity that affects investors’ confidence. The
International Monetary Fund in the Global Finan-
cial Stability Report estimated potential losses
stemming from corporate lending for several coun-
tries and the resulting estimates are very diversi-
fied. The importance of the ECB’s exercise – which
will use a uniform definition of NPL – is therefore
immediately evident.
Bank analysts report different numbers for the
capital shortfalls in Europe’s banking system.
Table 1 reports a selection of different estimates.
The numbers generally vary between €100 billion
and €300 billion even though some estimates are
significantly higher. Behind the wide range of
estimates there are differences in methodologies,
in particular assumptions on the size of stress and
the systemic interconnectedness of the banks,
but also uncertainty as regards the the quality of
banks’ balance sheets and therefore the
underlying data on which estimates are carried
out. Concerning the geographical distribution of
potential needs, market analysts seem to agree
that the surprises are more likely to come from
those countries where banks have not been
subject to a thorough review, eg in the context of
EU/IMF programmes. 
The capitalisation of euro-area banks has certainly
improved in recent years. According to the ECB,
“euro-area banks have raised around €225 billion
of fresh capital and a further €275 billion has
been injected by governments, equivalent in total
0
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Figure 1: Major banks, price/book ratio (%)
Source: Bruegel based on SNL Financials. Note: the data is
computed as the unweighted average of the five largest
banks in each country.
Table 1: Selected estimates of the capital needs
of Europe’s banks
Source of estimate € bns Publication date
Credit Suisse 50 16/10/2013
Goldman Sachs 75 31/10/2013
Standard & Poor's 95 08/11/2013
Standard & Poor's 110 12/12/2013
PricewaterhouseCoopers 280 28/11/2013
VLAB 652 23/11/2013
Source: Bruegel based on analysts’ reports and press reports.07
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to more than 5 per cent of euro-area GDP”15since
the beginning of the crisis. Core Tier 1 capital has
increased substantially and the median now
amounts to a healthy 12 percent16. Non-risk
weighted average tangible equity in the euro
area's nine global systemically important banks
stands at 3 percent17. 
However, an assessment of the recapitalisation
needs of banks ultimately requires deep supervi-
sory knowledge and involves a number of impor-
tant choices in the stress tests. Potential
recapitalisation needs depend on future growth,
on the future development of non-performing
loans and other factors that determine the per-
formance of banks’ assets. A particularly relevant
issue is the systemic dimension of the stress with
which the system will be confronted in the stress
tests. Many of the banks that will be tested are
systemic for the countries in which they are incor-
porated and for the euro area as a whole. In its
note laying out some of the key principles of the
comprehensive assessment, the ECB emphasises
that an add-on of 1 percentage point of Tier 1 cap-
ital will be requested to take into account the sys-
temic relevance of the banks concerned. The ECB
also makes clear that the comprehensive assess-
ment will not only concern the banks individually
but that, because of the magnitude of the exer-
cise, it should rather be seen an assessment of
the whole banking system.
A particularly relevant question is thus how sys-
temic risk is taken into account. It is important to
understand that systemic risk can give rise to non-
linear effects on capital shortfalls. While at small-
scale shocks, required capital buffers increase
gradually, at larger shocks, some banks may sud-
denly require much larger capital increases
because spillovers magnify the shock. However,
it is also possible that at some capital levels, sys-
temic interconnectedness abruptly goes down18.
The New York University’s Stern V-Lab publishes
estimates of systemic risk for major banks19. The
estimates are based on publicly available infor-
mation and include correlations of market price as
well as currently reported capital levels. The cen-
tral factors driving the estimates are the fact that
leverage is measured at market values and that
tail-risks are correlated. The estimated capital
shortfall is then based on a drop in the aggregate
market value of 40 percent. The estimates there-
fore capture true systemically relevant episodes
but are not necessarily comparable with the out-
come of the ECB’s exercise. Applying this method-
ology would result in a number of €652.62 billion
for the euro area20. Using the same methodology,
Dor (2013) estimates the capital shortfall for the
euro-area banking system to be €597.48 billion21.
The capital shortfalls differ significantly in differ-
ent countries. Such a tough approach may be
exaggerated for next year’s exercise because the
size of the asset market shock would resemble
the one experienced at the beginning of the crisis,
an event very unlikely to be repeated in the next
few years. Nevertheless, in the medium-run, suf-
ficient capitalisation of the banking system to
withstand such a shock is desirable.
A second relevant factor is the treatment of sover-
eign bonds on the books of banks. The issue of
sovereign holdings is a thorn in the side of both
the ECB and European regulators, in light of the
perverse dynamics observed during the crisis and
the increasing exposure to sovereign debt of
banks in some countries. As far as the ECB exer-
cise is concerned, the published guidelines refer
to the inclusion of sovereign bond holdings in the
in-depth assessment conducted in the Asset Qual-
ity Review (AQR), but there is no information about
whether and how they will be treated in the sub-
sequent stress test, nor is it clarified how sover-
eign debt will be valued. In the AQR, it is advisable
to treat sovereign debt at current market value and
not at book value because lower market values do
weigh on banks’ balance sheets and may there-
fore curtail lending to corporations and house-
holds. In the medium-run, single exposure rules
or risk weights should be introduced for sovereign
debt as a further way of breaking the link between
banks and sovereigns, but such rules cannot be
applied immediately (Sapir and Wolff, 2013). One
should therefore not include sovereign debt in the
stress tests because this could lead to negative
short-term dynamics akin to the immediate intro-
duction of sovereign risk weights.
Ultimately, the capital needs can only credibly be
assessed with detailed information on banks’ bal-
ance sheets and on their systemic interconnect-
edness. Even more importantly, not all necessary
15. ECB Note, Comprehen-
sive Assessment October
2013,
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ub/pdf/other/notecompre-
hensiveassess-
ment201310en.pdf.
16. Constanzio (2013).
17. Sapir and Wolff (2013),
based on FDIC statistics.
18. See for example,
Schweitzer (2009) for an
easy introduction. Also Xin
et al(2011).
19. Global MES model for
Systemic Risk Analysis by
NYU Stern,
http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/an
alysis/RISK.WORLDFIN-
MR.GMES.
20. This number refers to
the 17 euro-area countries
minus Estonia and Luxem-
bourg, for which data are
not reported. Last data
update: 30/11/2013.
21. This number refers to
the 17 euro-area countries
minus Estonia, Luxem-
bourg, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Malta and Ireland. Last data
update: 27/09/2013.08
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policy decisions have been taken that will allow
the assessment of the capital shortfalls. The most
important policy choices concern GDP projections,
the treatment of sovereign debt and the extent to
which systemic risk is taken into account in the
tests. The ECB has therefore clearly communi-
cated that no intermediate results can be pub-
lished22. The fact that capital levels have increased
in recent years does certainly not preclude the
potential for further recapitalisation needs being
detected.
To establish its credibility as a supervisor, the ECB
should not only be tough in its assessment. It
should also not shy away from forcing banks to
raise new capital and in ultima ratioforcing banks
into restructuring and resolution. The result may
be temporary volatility on the financial market,
which should be weighed against the cost of a
lasting weak and dysfunctional banking system
and the credibility of the ECB as a supervisor and
also as a monetary authority.  In the period of pos-
sible financial instability, the ECB should stand
ready to provide large amounts of liquidity to the
banking system. Governments should be sup-
portive of this policy, even if the liquidity provision
would result in a rise in Target2 balances.
Against this background, the next section dis-
cusses principles and practices of bank recapital-
isation. Particular emphasis is put on the existing
rules, which are the state aid rules, on the BRRD
and on the principles that should govern the SRM.
2 BANK RECAPITALISATION: HOW AND WHEN
The comprehensive assessment of Europe’s bank-
ing system in 2014 will start the phase of single
bank supervision in Europe. The exercise is of fun-
damental importance for the ECB, because it will
be the basis of its reputation as supervisor. Some
market participants seem to have doubts about
the fact that the exercise will be a game-changer.
A recent investor survey run by Morgan Stanley23
showed that the majority of investors interviewed
did not see the AQR/stress tests as likely to have
‘To establish its credibility as a supervisor, the ECB should not only be tough in its assessment.
It should also not shy away from forcing non-viable banks into restructuring and resolution,
though the result may be temporary volatility on the financial market.’
a meaningful impact on boosting lending. To avoid
episodes like Dexia – which jeopardised the rep-
utation of the EBA’s stress tests in 2011 – ensur-
ing credibility is crucial, and statements from ECB
officials suggest it will be biting. ECB President
Draghi has stated24 that if banks “do have to fail,
they have to fail. There is no doubt about that”.
This consideration has led to animated discus-
sions at the political level across Europe about
how to deal with the shortfalls that will possibly
be discovered. More specifically, a key point in the
debate surrounding the ECB’s exercise is the opti-
mal degree of private versus public contribution
to the recapitalisation, in the case of banks that
were not able or willing to raise all (or part) of the
needed capital on the market.
A number of issues should be carefully considered
when deciding on the how and when of bank
recapitalisation. 
Who should decide on whether a bank needs to
raise capital? There is a difference between legal
requirements and what the results of the compre-
hensive assessment could document, which
stems ultimately from the supervisory choices
underlying the design of the exercise. This also
closely relates to the issue of when a bank is put
into resolution and when it should be instead
recapitalised. Raising of capital on the private mar-
kets versus public recapitalisation. Under what cir-
cumstances should European funds be used, and
under what conditions should national funds be
relied on? 
The answer to the question of when a bank should
be resolved rather than recapitalised, and who
decides on this, is currently unclear. Under exist-
ing legislation, a bank can be forced to raise capi-
tal when it falls below the 4.5 percent threshold
defined by the CRDIV/CRR. In case the capital
threshold of 4.5 percent is met, the ECB has still,
like any supervisor, the option to ask the bank to
increase its capital. The decision on whether a
bank should be put into resolution or recapitalised
necessarily involves some degree of discretion on
22. Asmussen (2013): “We
will not publish any prelimi-
nary or intermediate results
and I am quite surprised
about the noise you hear
these days in all directions
about the possible outcome
of the exercise. If we knew
that ‘banks in the periphery
will not face severe prob-
lems’ or if we knew that ‘the
recapitalisation needs will
be a double digit  billion
figure’ we could spare the
effort in conducting this
exercise. All these state-
ments are mere
speculation”.
23. Morgan Stanley (2013)
‘EU Banks and Div Fins –
2014 Outlook: 10 key
themes and top picks’,
Morgan Stanley Research
Europe, 5 December.
24. Stefan Riecher and Jeff
Black (2013) ‘Draghi Says
ECB Won’t Hesitate to Fail
Banks in Stress Tests’,
Bloomberg News, 23
October. 09
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION Silvia Merler and Guntram B. Wolff  ENDING UNCERTAINTY
the part of the supervisors. But there are also tech-
nical issues that should be taken into account. In
particular, it would be at present very difficult for
the ECB to put a bank into ‘gone concern’, ie force
it to actually restructure, even assuming that it
wanted to, if the bank’s current capital ratio
exceeds 4.5 percent. In case resolution is the
avenue chosen, the ECB would have to work
closely with national resolution and supervisory
authorities.
Unfortunately, in the absence of a single resolu-
tion framework – at the time of writing the SRM is
in the early stage of negotiations and the BRRD
has yet to be finalised – there is currently no EU
harmonisation of the procedures for resolving
credit institutions. Under current legislation, the
ECB would have to work with numerous national
resolution authorities, each operating under dif-
ferent legal rules and political logics. This is likely
to lead to massively different recapitalisation and
restructuring practices across the EU. This would
not only constitute a very difficult situation for the
ECB, but would also likely lead to a further re-
nationalisation of banking and fragmentation of
the financial system25.
Private or public resources: transition towards a
rules-based system
A central question in the context of the ECB
assessment is what to do with banks that fail the
stress test – ie are found to have a capital shortfall
– but are not to be resolved. In such circum-
BOX 1: RECAPITALISATION AND STATE AID RULES
The new state aid rules introduce important elements of relevance for the re-capitalisation of banks.
Two aspects are central:
First, ex-ante evaluation is strengthened. The European Commission communication* clarifies in
particular that state intervention (in the form of recapitalisations and impaired asset measures
including asset guarantees) will be authorised only if the member state concerned has previously
demonstrated that all measures to limit such aid to the minimum necessary have been fully
exploited. To that end, the “Member States are invited to submit a capital raising plan, before or as
part of the submission of a restructuring plan”. This means that as a general rule, a restructuring
plan will have to be notified to the Commission and a final state aid approval will have to be obtained
before recapitalisation is undertaken. An exception is foreseen, but only in cases in which the com-
petent supervisory authority expressly confirms that the rescue aid is required.
Second, a bail-in framework is de factointroduced. The communication states that the restructuring
plan must cater for “adequate burden-sharing”. More specifically, “before granting any kind of
restructuring aid [...] to a bank all capital generating measures including the conversion of junior
debt should be exhausted, provided that fundamental rights are respected and financial stability is
not put at risk”. A pecking order is also specified, with losses being first absorbed by equity and then
by contributions from hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders. The contribution from
senior debt holders will instead not be required as a mandatory component of burden-sharing under
state aid rules. The communication also draws a distinction between cases of banks found to be
below the minimum regulatory capital requirements or not. In cases of banks falling below the min-
imum regulatory capital requirements, “subordinated debt must be converted or written down, in
principle before state aid is granted. State aid must not be granted before equity, hybrid capital and
subordinated debt have fully contributed to offset any losses”. In cases of banks with capital ratios
above the EU regulatory minimum, the communication points out that  “the bank should normally
be able to restore the capital position on its own, in particular through capital raising measures”but
if there were no other possibilities, “then subordinated debt must be converted into equity, in prin-
ciple before state aid is granted”.
* Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of state aid rules to support measures
in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:216:0001:0015:EN:PDF. 25. See for example Sapir
and Wolff (2013).10
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stances, the ECB will as the relevant supervisor
ask the bank to raise its capital levels.
If a bank cannot or does not want to raise private
capital, under current legislation, state aid rules
would determine how public resources would be
used. In July 2013, the European Commission
issued a new communication that amends the
rules for state aid to banks. The new regime
includes a number of fundamental changes,
which will have bearings in the context of the ECB’s
exercise (Box 1).
The new state aid rules therefore subordinate the
possibility to use public funds for the recapitali-
sation of a bank to the previous implementation
of an “appropriate”amount of bail-in. These rules
extend the idea of bail-in beyond the resolution
context, to the case of recapitalisation of banks
that are not in resolution, and it will be applicable
in the context of the ECB exercise. Banks that are
not able to raise all the capital they need on the
market would therefore need to bail-in their sub-
ordinated debt-holders before having the option
to access public money.
The modification of the state aid rule works as a
bridge towards the fully harmonised framework
that will be introduced with the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD). The BRRD includes a
number of important provisions, which can rightly
be considered game changers in European bank-
ing. They also represent a significant step forward
in terms of creating a harmonised approach to
bank resolution and to the resolution of the large
banks to be supervised by the ECB directly. In par-
ticular, the BRRD foresees:
￿ An asset separation tool;
￿ Bail-in of investor capital, which is mandatory
up to 8 percent of the bank’s non-risk-weighted
assets, before using any public sector
money26;
￿ That banks issue debt that is subject to bail-in
￿ Establishment of a resolution fund financed by
the industry;
￿ A requirement for banks to provide resolution
plans.
It is the declared aim of the EU heads of state and
government to not only have the BRRD in place by
the time of the ECB’s comprehensive assessment
but also to have agreed on a single resolution
mechanism by that time. However many BRRD
provisions will not be applicable during 2014 and
2015, so state aid rules will apply27. The handling
of the results of the stress test and the compre-
hensive assessment more generally should be
uniform across member states in 2014/15 (Véron,
2013). Differences in the bail-in rules, with some
countries haircutting junior debt only while others
also go after senior debt, should not be arbitrary,
but should be exclusively based on an independ-
ent assessment of the systemic consequences of
such action. If the differences in generosity to bail-
out banks relate mostly to the fiscal space of a
country, the vicious circle between banks and sov-
ereigns will be reinforced in the next two years. 
On the extent to which private and public money
should be used for bank recapitalisation, in prin-
ciple, banks found to be undercapitalised with
respect to the benchmark set by the ECB will be
asked to raise capital on the market. This is what
banks would normally do and it should be seen as
the benchmark also for the stress test. However,
a number of specific factors can make the issue
more complicated. First, the different estimates of
potential capital shortfalls reported in the previ-
ous section show that the numbers could be quite
big. This could give rise to a situation in which
some of these banks do not manage to raise all of
the required capital on the market28. In such
instances, the use of some public resources might
be desirable in order to prevent major fire-sales of
assets. Those public resources should, however,
only be used according to clear and strict rules,
including the bail-in of junior creditors in line with
state aid rules and even the bail-in of senior cred-
itors may be contemplated. The debate here cen-
tres on the date at which the bail-in tool will be
made operational. The BRRD currently foresees
‘The new state aid rules extend the idea of bail-in beyond the resolution context. Banks that are
not able to raise all the capital they need on the market would therefore need to bail-in their
subordinated debt-holders before having the option to access public money.’
26. “A contribution to loss
absorption and recapitali-
sation equal to an amount
not less than 8 percent of
the total liabilities including
own funds of the institution
under resolution, measured
at the time of resolution
action in accordance with
the valuation provided for in
Article 30, has been made
by shareholders and the
holders of other instru-
ments of ownership, the
holders of relevant capital
instruments and other eligi-
ble liabilities through write
down, conversion or other-
wise”, Article 38 (3cab) of
the Council proposal for a
Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Coun-
cil establishing a framework
for the recovery and resolu-
tion of credit institutions
and investment firms,
http://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/bru
sselsblog/files/2013/06/BR
R.pdf.
27. BRRD initially foresaw
the bail-in provisions taking
effect from 2018, but this
has recently been changed
to 2016.
28. Banks are major
investors in other banks,
and having possibly several
big European banks on the
market for capital at the
same time could therefore
reduce the number of
potential investors.11
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the tool becoming available only in 2016. The
main argument advanced for this date that banks
need time to prepare. The counterargument is that
the solution to significant past problems can only
hardly be imposed on taxpayers, that have
already significantly contributed, and that it would
therefore be preferable to impose them on current
bank creditors.
Bail-in can be an effective tool in reducing the cost
of rescuing a bank. Its application on a systemic
scale risks introducing a negative confidence
effect that would induce investors to rush out of
otherwise solvent banks  with evident financial
stability risks29. However, in a situation in which
capital is above the regulatory minimum, the
usage of public capital is not entirely convincing
because the capital levels are anyway above the
legal requirement. At the same time, there is a risk
that not all banks manage to raise the entire
amount they need on the market, based on the
fact that several very big banks could go to the
market for capital as a result of the stress test and
the amount needed could be sizable. A solution to
this dilemma might be to agree on longer transi-
tion periods during which banks would raise cap-
ital on the market.
More problematic is the case in which the capital
level is below the legal minimum but there is a
going concern. Here, the use of public capital is
much more straightforwardly regulated and the
central question is then how much to dilute the
current shareholders of banks. The state aid regu-
lation does cater for exceptions to the bail-in
requirements in cases in which implementing
such measures would “endanger financial stabil-
ity or lead to disproportionate results”but the cir-
cumstances are not defined. This has the
advantage of leaving flexibility to cope with
unforeseen situations. At the same time, flexibility
introduces yet another element of uncertainty
from the point of view of the investors that the
framework was supposed to reassure, and it
increases the risk that flexibility will result in
public recapitalisations even in cases in which no
financial stability risk exists. The bail-in of senior
debt should not be excluded ex ante. The experi-
ence with two middle-sized Danish banks,
Amagerbanken and Fjordbank Mors, shows that
bail-ins can be handled without systemic implica-
tions (even though the situation is not fully com-
parable with the current situation)30. However,
senior bond holder involvement can have sys-
temic implications, which would need to be care-
fully assessed before the decision to bail-in.
Overall, we acknowledge that the framework
should be based on very clear and binding rules
which minimise taxpayer involvement. However,
some flexibility might be necessary in very
exceptional cases. The governance of exercising
this flexibility is of crucial importance. To exercise
flexibility, it is important to clearly define the
authority that will exercise the discretion. The
BRRD framework is clearly insufficient for
exercising this discretion because national
authorities will still play a dominant role. This
could lead to vastly different applications of the
rules causing significant distortions in the
European banking market and increasing
substantially the policy uncertainty for bankers.
It is therefore of central importance to finish the
work on the Single Resolution Mechanism.
The SRM should be able to take meaningful bank
resolution decisions in a short time period.  Una-
nimity voting mechanisms are not suited for such
an aim. It is therefore necessary to revert to
normal or qualified majority voting. This means
that national authorities can be overruled, even
where there are fiscal implications. Further steps
to ensure the appropriate legitimacy of this
process are necessary.
National or European public resources?
The further policy question concerns the use of
national or European public resources for bank
recapitalisation. This discussion should be seen
in the light of the potentially very large risks iden-
tified above. More generally, banking crises can
have very large fiscal implications31. To perma-
nently and credibly break the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns, credible insur-
ance for large risks is necessary. The build-up of
a resolution fund, paid from contributions from the
banks covered is an important step. In the steady
state in which the common resolution fund would
be funded by the large banks, it would make
sense to organise this fund at European level
because individual countries often do not have a
29. ECB President Mario
Draghi expressed concern
about such an outcome in a
letter sent to the Commis-
sion, see for example
http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-10-22/eu-law-
makers-reject-draghi-call-
for-bank-bondholder-cleme
ncy.html. He called for flexi-
bility in the case of banks
found to need more capital
without falling below the
minimum regulatory
requirement. Calls for limit-
ing the scope of bail-in were
also at the root of a dis-
agreement between EU
finance ministers and the
European Parliament, which
delayed the finalisation of
the BRRD. In particular, the
Parliament strongly called
for authorities to be allowed
temporarily to nationalise a
bank while protecting
senior creditors, based on
the argument that in some
circumstances temporary
nationalisation and the
other so-called ‘government
financial stabilisation tools’
would be needed to protect
financial stability. By con-
trast, finance ministers
agreed in June 2013 that
wiping out 8 percent of a
failing bank’s liabilities
would normally be needed
before having the possibil-
ity to access backstops
(such as the resolution
funds).
30. For details, see Darvas
(2013).
31. Pisani-Ferry and Wolff
(2012).012
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sufficient number of large banks to provide a
meaningful number to diversify risks. However, to
be fully credible, such a fund would need to have
a credit line to the European taxpayer, which
could, for example, be based on the ESM. In the
steady state, it will also be important to keep
national taxpayers on the hook. As long as numer-
ous national policies influence the likelihood of
bank failures, the continuing exposure of national
taxpayers alongside the common insurance fund
is justified.
For the transition, the main principle should be
that the European insurance fund should be only
used for large risks that endanger national public
solvency. National budgets can take care of small
public recapitalisation needs. For somewhat larger
risks, a programme similar to the Spanish pro-
gramme is advisable in order to avoid the risk of a
country’s government being priced out of the
market. In some cases of very large capital needs,
direct bank recapitalisation from the ESM, com-
bined with national taxpayer contributions, is
advisable to take care of the legacy problems. This
can be motivated not only by the fact that govern-
ment solvency problems should be prevented.
Equally important is the fact that some of banking
problems are not the responsibility of faulty
national supervision, but have arisen for euro-area
financial stability concerns32. In such circum-
stances, the case for burden sharing is strong. It
is impossible to agree ex ante on precise thresh-
olds at which direct bank recapitalisation should
be carried out. Certainly, when banking rescue
costs are high, a debt sustainability analysis
should be undertaken. There may also be
instances in which government solvency is in any
case endangered undermining the logic of direct
bank recapitalisation. During the transition, policy
discretion will remain a defining element of pro-
viding support. However, it is important to limit this
discretion as much as possible so that the same
conditions pertain for all countries. Furthermore,
it is important that the ECOFIN clearly signals its
intention to find the best European solution for the
recapitalisation and restructuring during the tran-
sition, and that it commits to a clear roadmap
towards a European resolution authority that will
eventually take such decisions with qualified
majority voting and based on a single backstop33.
CONCLUSIONS
The euro area has embarked on a process of cre-
ating a banking union, which is of critical impor-
tance to the stability of the common currency
area. After the creation of the single supervisory
mechanism, the debate now focuses on bank
recapitalisation, not least because of the ECB's
forthcoming stress test.
Considerable uncertainty prevails for investors in
European banks about the quality of banks’
assets, the valuation of assets by policy makers
and the rules under which losses will be handled.
Reducing all three uncertainties will improve
funding conditions throughout the euro area.
Policy makers should therefore increase their
commitment to harmonise as much as possible
bail-out/bail-in decisions in the next year, and
they should agree on a clear roadmap towards a
workable SRM34. The ECB should define clearly the
rules under which the assessment will be done.
This includes, inter-alia, the definition of the stress
test and the treatment and valuation of sovereign
debt. Finally, governments should be prepared to
recapitalise banks where necessary and there
should be a political commitment to direct bank
recapitalisation if it is needed to avoid government
insolvency.
32. See Asmussen (2013).
33. We therefore go further
than the ECOFIN Council
conclusion of 15 November
and acknowledge the need
for direct bank recap under
specific circumstances.
Council statement on EU
banks' asset quality
reviews and stress tests,
including on backstop
arrangements. Economic
and Financial Affairs, Coun-
cil meeting Brussels, 15
November 2013,
http://www.consilium.europ
a.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs
/press-
data/en/ecofin/139613.pdf
34. Creating a workable
SRM is not an easy task as
Véron and Wolff (2013) out-
lined in February.
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